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SUMMARY
Economic planners and government officials in Thailand
face a major decision: whether to encourage a NIC's (Newly
Industrialized Country) type of strategy based on manufacturing
exports from the urbanized central region, which will probably
require increasing dependence on foreign investment and
technology, especially from Japan; or follow a NAIC's (Newly
Agro-Industrialized Country) type of strategy based on agro-
industry exports, which will probably mean less rapid growth
overall but an improvement in rural conditions as well as more
independence through investment from internal sources. This
article examines this choice from the perspective of Thailand as
well as Japan, its largest source of aid and foreign investment.
We argue that a combination of manufacturing and agro-
industries is necessary for continued development and that this
will require more cooperation between Thailand and Japan as
well as more Japanese assistance.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Economists as well as foreign investors often consider Thailand to be the
country most likely to catch up with Asia's Newly Industrialized Countries
(NICs), primarily Korea and Taiwan, which have grown rapidly since the 1960s
by exporting manufactured goods rather than agricultural products. Thailand
has been one of the fastest growing countries in the world, with much of its
growth supported by manufacturing investments and output (Table 1). It also
continues to be a promising site for foreign investment because of high growth
without much inflation, unstable exchange rates, or political turmoil, at least in
comparison to many other developing countries.
[Table 1 here]
Japan has led the way in foreign investments, focusing on export-oriented
manufacturing sectors, such as electrical and electronics products as well as
chemical and non-metal goods. Total new and additional investment (unadjusted
for inflation) from Japan rose from $48 million in 1985 to $859 million in 1988
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1988; Keizai Koho Center, 1989). The total stock
of Japanese investments in Thailand by mid-1989 had reached $3.5 billion,
compared to merely $871 million for the next largest investor, Taiwan (Sanger,
1990).
Despite this record of growth and new investment, however, economic
planners and government officials in Thailand, as well as Japanese government
agencies, research institutes, and companies, have found themselves in a debate
of critical importance to the future of Thailand: whether to encourage a NIC's
type of development based on manufacturing exports from the urbanized central
region, or encourage a NAIC's (Newly Agro-Industrialized Country) type of
development based on exports from "agro-industries" (the processing of
agricultural products). Although the two approaches need not be mutually
1
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exclusive, the dilemma within Thailand is that many groups want to take
advantage of Japanese investment, which is concentrated in manufacturing
sectors located in the central region of Thailand, but this type of investment
tends to worsen urban problems already existing in the Bangkok area and does
little to solve equally pressing problems related to rural poverty. In addition,
Thailand may not have the economic resources to build sufficient infrastructure
needed for industrial-based development such as required by foreign, especially
Japanese, manufacturing investments.
This article examines the conditions and policies influencing the course of
Thailand's economic development primarily from the perspective of Thailand's
biggest investor and foreign-aid donor -- Japan -- in order to understand the
probable course of economic development in Thailand as well as the impact of
Japanese public and private investment on Thai' development. The major
argument is that a combination of elements are pushing Thailand in potentially
opposite directions, with Japanese investments especially making a heavier
emphasis on export-oriented manufacturing a likely path, even though domestic
conditions suggest a slower, mixed approach, combining agro-businesses with
some manufacturing, may actually be the wisest strategy to follow.
2. INTERNAL FACTORS INFLUENCING THAI DEVELIPMENT
Two internal factors have had an important impact on Thai development
and encouraged a mixture of manufacturing-based and agriculture-based
development. One, political stability, has helped make Thailand the most
attractive location for Japanese investors moving operations to Asia. A second,
the Thai agricultural sector, has contributed cheap labor and food as well as
surplus capital to support manufacturing investments while also providing raw
2
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materials and finished products for agro-industries. Numerous problems remain
in the agricultural sector, however, and these have contributed to urban
problems as a result of migration into the Bangkok area.
(a) Political Stability
In 1988, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Bangkok recorded the
largest number of registered members among the ASEAN 1 countries (Japanese
Chamber of Commerce in Bangkok, 1989b). This reflects the attractiveness of
Thailand to Japanese firms as a place for investment in Southeast Asia.
Abundant, cheap, and hard-working labor, a history of successful economic
performance with stable exchange rates and low inflation, cultural traditions
familiar to the Japanese, and the foreign-investment promotion policies of the
Thai government, including tax policies allowing foreign firms to remit most of
their profits back to their home countries (Smith, 1989a), are among the reasons
frequently cited for Thailand's popularity. In addition, economic growth
stimulated by the Vietnam War created a high demand in Thailand during the
1960s and early 1970s for Japanese goods, which Japanese firms had to produce
locally because of the Thai government's import-substitution policies. Compared
to most other countries in East and Southeast Asia, Japan also maintained
relatively good political relations with Thailand, which it did not colonize
during World War II (Yamashita et al., 1989).
Of equal or greater importance than these factors appeared to be
Thailand's political stability, at least in comparison to other countries in
Southeast and East Asia. In the 1980s, the Philippines, Korea, Taiwan, and
China all faced strong political challenges against state control and political
1 ASEAN is an abbreviation for the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations. Members, in addition to Thailand, include Indonesia, the Philippines,
Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei.
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corruption. Malaysia and Indonesia encountered less political turmoil in this
decade, although they faced internal problems stemming from racial and
religious conflicts among their ethnically diverse populations. In contrast to
these neighboring countries, Thailand's constitutional monarchy, along with
harmony between ethnic Chinese and native Thai, who shared Buddhism as the
.dominant religion, seemed to create a social and political environment amenable
to economic investment.
The ouster of Thailand's military dictators in 1973 also contributed to
changes in the Thai political system in that organized groups, such as university
students, urban workers, and farmers, which historically had been silent in
Thailand, suddenly gained national influence. Even though the country
experienced-another military takeover in 1976, Thailand successfully reduced the
impact of the military on decision making for ec6nomic and social planning
(Suehiro, 1985). Supported by the popularity of the civilian Chatichai
administration that came to power in 1988, the public political role of the
military continued to decline in the late 1980s (Tasker, 1989). As part of this
political evolution, it also appears that a consensus has emerged among the
different groups now active in Thai politics that democratization as well as
economic development are necessary for Thailand to prosper in the future.
At the same time, however, rapid industrialization and urbanization,
particularly in Bangkok and surrounding areas has caused serious problems for
the Thai government that may threaten this economic success and political
stability. These problems include poor housing conditions, crowded buses, air
and water pollution, and recurrent floods worsened by land sinking from the
digging of deep industrial wells (National Economic and Social Development
Board, 1986a). In addition, activism among Thai labor unions, especially at
state-owned enterprises faced with government privatization plans, appeared to
4
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be on the rise (International Labor Organization, 1987; Paisal, 1988; Tasaka,
1989; Handley, 1989).
(b) The Agricultural Sector
The Thai agricultural sector has supported industrialization in several
ways. Increases in agricultural production have helped expand national income
and government revenues, creating surplus capital for investment. Agriculture
has also provided cheap food and labor for the manufacturing sector. In
addition, Thai agriculture has carried out a unique role as a source of
increasingly diversified exports, beginning with traditional products such as rice
and rubber; post-World War iI products, such as maize, tapioca, kenaf, and
sugar; and then recent products, such as canned fruit and frozen chicken. In
fact, Thailand is one of only a few food exporters among developing countries.
In 1988, 105 billion baht worth of agricultural products out of 248 billion baht
in gross domestic agricultural output were exported (42% of agricultural output).
Agricultural and marine product exports were decreasing in their share of total
exports, but represented 43% in 1985 and 31% in 1988. In terms of export
items, in 1988, rice (35 billion baht), rubber (26 billion), and tapioka (22 billion)
occupied second, third, and fourth positions, respectively, following textile
products (58 billion) (Thailand Development Research Institute Foundation, 1989).
Yet the traditional and the post-war agricultural exports seemed to have
reached a limit in the 1980s, because some countries that formerly imported
large quantities of food achieved self-sufficiency, increasing competition among
food exporters (Ishida, 1988). Thai companies and government officials were
trying to manage this situation by further diversifying Thailand's agricultural
products as well as attempting skillful marketing efforts. Recent increases in
the export of chicken, shrimp, and other canned foods suggest that this
5
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approach has worked and Thailand has the potential to increase agro-industry
exports even further, which would help bring needed income to farmers in rural
areas as well as earn foreign currency. Particularly important to this trend
have been the emergence of large plantations, especially for palm cultivation,
actively promoted by the Thai government's Board of Investment and run by
agro-businesses owned by Thai or by joint ventures with foreign investors, and
the formation of integrated production and distribution organizations that have
made serious efforts to improve production technology and international
marketing, as observed in the chicken (broiler) industry (Shigetomi, 1987;
Suehiro, 1987b; Viraphong, 1989).
Yet, although the agricultural sector has contributed to the development of
the Thai economy in various ways, rural poverty has continued and this has
caused difficulties not only in agricultural areas but'in urban areas as well, due
to the migration of farm worker. One problem is that government policies
have kept prices of food low and manufactured goods high, a process that tends
to transfer surplus capital from agriculture to manufacturing sectors. In spite
of rapid increases in productivity for manufacturing relative to agriculture, the
government protects import-substitution manufacturing products through a high
import tax and regulation of the number of companies in one field; this keeps
prices for these manufactured goods high, while there are no similar measures
for agricultural products.
In addition, although the government's official policy changed from
supporting import-substitute industrialization to export-oriented industrialization
in the early 1970s, among manufacturing sectors, so far only the textile
industry has been able to compete internationally, partly because of measures
favoring import-substitution industries. Furthermore, in 1987, the average
monthly wage for private employment in the agricultural sector was merely
6
1,106 baht, compared to 2,137 baht in the manufacturing sector (National
Statistical Office, 1987). The producers' price index for the manufacturing
sector has also been consistently higher than that for agriculture (Japanese
Chamber of Commerce in Bangkok, 1989a). Thus, while favoring domestic
manufacturing over agriculture may have concentrated capital useful for
industrial investments, Thailand has yet to develop its own manufacturing
exports, while this policy may also have prevented the agricultural sector from
increasing prices and accumulating capital it needs for further investment.
Investment in agriculture is important because this sector is still the major
source of employment in Thailand, accounting for 67% of total employment as
late as 1986, the last year for which complete data are available (Table 2).
Although the percentage of employment in agriculture has been declining, the
absolute number of people working in this sector was still increasing, rising
from just under 16 million in 1980 to approximately 17.8 million in 1986.
Furthermore, according to the sixth National Social and Economic Development
Plan (1986-1991), approximately 3.9 million new workers are expected to enter
the labor market (National Economic and Social Development Board, 1986b). It
is unlikely that non-agricultural sectors can provide enough employment to
absorb these new workers as well as people expected to leave rural areas,
especially if productivity and incomes in the agricultural sector do not improve.
As seen in a comparison of Tables 1 and 2, agriculture, which occupied more
than two-thirds of the employed population, accounted for less than 17% of
Thailand's gross domestic product in the mid-1980s, as opposed to more than
20% for manufacturing, which accounted for merely 8% of the employed
population.
[Table 2 here]
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(c) Continuing Rural (and Urban) Problems
Data on the level of urbanization (defined as the ratio of population living
in municipal areas compared to the total population) and domestic population
immigration, land tenancy, the amount of virgin land available for cultivation,
as well as land productivity, all indicate that neglecting rural development has
created serious problems for Thailand in both rural and urban regions, with
dramatic increases in the number of people moving into metropolitan Bangkok
from agricultural areas. Even in 1985, Thailand was a relatively rural society
compared to other ASEAN countries, where the level of urbanization was 25% in
Indonesia, 38% in Malaysia, and 40% in the Philippines. In Thailand it was
merely 18% (Asian Development Bank, 1989), although this represented an
increase from approximately 13% in both 1970 and in 1960 (National Statistical
Office, 1960 and 1970).
The 1980 census da a, however, show clearly that there was far more
migration from rural and urban communities to the Bangkok Metropolitan Area
and the surrounding region than from one rural area to another or from urban
to rural areas. For example, the net inflow of migrants to the Bangkok
Metropolitan Area and the surrounding five prefectures accounted for 90% of
the country's net migrants from 1975 to 1980 (National Statistical Office, 1980
and National Economic and Social Development Board, 1986a). The total
population in the Bangkok Mtropolitan Area (including Thon Buri) thus
increased from 2.1 million in 1960 to 5.8 million in 1986, only part of which
came from natural population growth. From 1970 to 1986, the annual population
growth rate in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area averaged 3.5%, compared to 2.5%
for the whole nation. During this period roughly 44% of the population growth
in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area can be attributed to migration (National
8
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Economic and Social Development Board, 1986a). 2
Other evidence of the rise in rural poverty has been growing land tenancy
(the percentage of agricultural land rented rather than owned by those who
worked it), which rose 42% in area nationwide from 1975 to 1986 (Table 3). In
1975, in the Central Region, 41% of all farms consisted of rented land; these
percentages were 27% in the North Region, 17% in the South, and 9% in the
Northeast (Suehiro, 1980). By region, the Northeast, the major source of
immigrants into Bangkok according to the 1980 census, experienced the largest
increase after 1975, estimated to be as much as 152%. Because Thai farm
statistics exclude non-land holders who are rural residents, these numbers
suggest a shift to land-holding levels inadequate to feed a family (generally
considered to be 25 rai for an average family).
[Table 3 here]
Responding to the increase in land tenancy, in 1975 the Thai government
issued a land reform law that gave farmers cultivating land owned by the
government legal title as well as purchased land for distribution. Land affected
amounted to 7.6 million rai, of which 5 million was public land and 2.6 million
was privately owned. By 1989, the reforms had transferred 3.1 million rai or
40% of the targeted land. The Agricultural Land Reform Office (ALRO) also
earmarked 2.7 million rai or 54% of all public land for distribution to poor
farmers. In addition, ALRO has purchased 361,830 rai or 14% of the privately
owned targeted land and rented 67% of it to farmers while reselling 12% on a
"hire-purchase" basis and leaving 21% not allocated (Preyaluk, 1989a).
This effort, however, has had limited results. Privately owned land
2 Data for 1960, 1970, and 1980 are from the annual censuses. Data for
1986 are from projections by the Working Group on Population Projections,
comprising NESDB, NSO, and the Institute of Population Studies, Chulalongkorn
University.
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targeted for distribution to farmers, which reduces their rent payments to
landlords, amounted to merely 14% of total land under tenancy in 1986
(Preyaluk, 1989a). In addition, much of the publicly owned land that was
distributed merely legalized the position of farmers illegally cultivating land,
and so the incomes of these people did not change. The land reform also did
not solve the problem of high land rents in certain areas. For example, while
in the Central Region, non-resident landlords dominate and there is a high
concentration of land tenancy but with relatively low rents, in part of the
North, there are more resident landlords, but they continued to impose higher
rents on tenants (Suehiro, 1980).
At the same time, distribution of publicly owned land along with increases
in the rural population as well as extensive commercial logging have destroyed
Thailand's forests, which covered 53% of the nation in 1961 and perhaps as
little as 29% in t a late 1980s (Suehiro, 1980; Norani, 1989). This was the
lowest figure among the ASEAN countries, with the exception of heavily
urbanized Singapore (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific,
1988). The destruction of forests causes various problems: damaged watersheds,
increased possibilities for flooding and soil erosion, reductions in the quantity
and quality of water, as well as potential damage to animals dependent on the
forests. These problems became so serious that in January 1989 the Thai
government officially 'anned commercial logging, although this has been
difficult to enforce (Norani, 1989).
Furthermore, while land has become scarcer for farmers, rural incomes
have suffered from little growth in output and agricultural productivity. While
total paddy production in Thailand between 1976 and 1985 grew from 15 million
metric tons to only 20 million, the average yield in paddy fields rose from 1,825
kilogram per hectare in 1975 to merely 2,052 kilogram per hectare in 1986. In
10
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contrast to the total output growth of 353%, land yield grew only by 12%.
Cultivated land per capita has stayed the same, at 0.38 hectares in both 1970
and 1985. This suggests that the increase of rice production came mainly from
the expansion both of the population cultivating rice fields and land area
available for cultivation, not from productivity growth. In fact, Thailand had
one of the lowest levels of productivity in paddy cultivation among developing
countries, with output levels less than half of China and merely a third of
South Korea, as well as behind countries such as Afghanistan and India (Table
4). In addition, Thai farmers in the 1980s suffered from sharp declines in the
international market price for rice, which fell from about $424 per metric in
1980 to $216 in 1985 (nominal values), as well as for maize, casaba, and sugar
cane (Asian Development Bank, 1989).
[Table 4 here]
The cultivation of different cash crops has diversified Thai agriculture and
created valuable export items, while skillful operations and marketing by Thai
agro-businesses have increased Thai agricultural production and exports. Yet
the limited results of these efforts, as well as of land reform, have failed to
solve problems such as land tenancy, low productivity in agriculture, and
massive migration to Thailand's capital city. The Thai government is aware of
these problems but has placed more emphasis on developing Thailand's urban
and industrial infrastructure rather than agriculture. This policy has been
especially evident in expensive examples such as the government's on-going
Eastern Seaboard projects, which contain a natural-gas refinery, a fertilizer
plant, two ports, and two industrial parks. Some Thai government officials have
also insisted that large migrations from rural areas, especially from the
Northeast, together with the expansion of cultivated land, have prevented land
fragmentation and raised per capita rural incomes, because migrants are
11
generally surplus agricultural workers. This view acknowledges the Bangkok
Metropolitan Area and the surrounding five prefectures as the center of growth
in Thailand and emphasizes the benefits of improving this urban area, where
most industry and growth are concentrated, at the expense of agricultural
regions (National Economic and Social Development Board, 1986b).
3. EXTERNAL FACTORS INFLUENCING THAI DEVELOPMENT
Whether export-oriented industries can create enough employment to
absorb rural migrants is not clear, and this is why government officials and
others see external investment from countries such as Japan as critical to
Thailand's continued economic development and perhaps political stability as
well. Japanese investment, however, has not only grown over time but
gradually s lifted from an emphasis on agriculture and natural resources to
manufacturing. Related to Thailand's appeal and the increase in manufacturing-
oriented investments has been growing political pressure on Japan to import
more manufacturing goods and the emergence of Thailand as well as other
countries in Southeast Asia as manufacturing bases for multinational firms from
Japan and other developed countries as well as from the NICs.
(a) Japanese Investments
Japanese overseas investments started to grow mainly after the late 1960s,
along with rapid economic growth at home, movement of Japanese companies
into international markets, improvement in Japan's balance of payments, and
decisions in the Japanese government to allow more foreign investment. In the
second half of the 1970s, Japanese direct investments abroad ranged between $3
and $5 billion per year, but, in the first half of the 1980s, they jumped to
12
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approximately $8 billion per year (nominal values) as the yen rose in value and
made overseas assets appear relatively inexpensive and production costs in Japan
high (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1987). Japanese
direct investment overseas in 1986 alone increased by 83% to over $22 billion
and in 1988 reached 47 billion dollars.
In terms of Japan's foreign investment stock, valued at more than $186
billion as of July 1989, North America represented the biggest share ($75
billion), followed by Asia, Latin America, Europe, and Oceania and Africa,
respectively, with between $30 and $32 billion invested in each area. After
North America, Asia also represented by far the largest site for Japan's
overseas manufacturing operations, with more than $12 billion worth of
investments (Table 5).
[Table 5 here]
In terms of the number of companies investing, Asia actually exceeded
North America as a site for Japanese investment. As of 1988, Asia accounted
for 37% of the cumulative number of Japanese firms investing abroad, compared
to 29% for North America (Toyo keizai, 1990). In absolute terms, Japanese
investments in Asia increased from $1.4 billion in 1985 to nearly $5.6 billion in
1988, primarily due to investments in the Korea, Taiwan, other NICs, as well as
Thailand and China. From 1986 to July 1989, out of 1,437 new cases of
Japanese firms expanding into Asia, 829 were in manufacturing and 262 in
commercial, financial, and service sectors. Among the manufacturing cases,
electrical and electronic appliances and equipment had the highest concentration
(193 firms), followed by chemicals (94) and automobiles and auto parts (73)
(Toyo keizai, 1990).
Breaking down Japanese investments by the number of firms entering
individual countries, since 1986 Thailand has enjoyed the largest number of
13
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cases. Thailand also ranked second in the world (behind only the United
States) in the number of new investment cases from January 1988 through July
1989 (Toyo keizai, 1990). Although other ASEAN countries, such as Indonesia
and Singapore, tended to be the object of larger projects and surpass Thailand
in terms of the value of Japanese investments, in 1988, Japanese investments in
Thailand for the first time were the largest in value among all the ASEAN
countries (Keizai Koho Center, 1989). This reflected both increasing labor costs
in the Asian NICs (Clifford and Moore, 1989) as well as the general appeal of
Thailand to Japanese investors.
Although more recent information is unavailable, data from 1983, even
prior to the large increases in Japanese investments in Thailand, indicate the
degree of importance Japanese firms have come to occupy in various Thai
manufacturing sectors. As seen in Table 6, based on estimates from a survey
by he Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Bangkok, Thai firms affiliated with
Japanese companies accounted for more than half of all domestic shipments (by
value) in the electrical equipment and automobile industries and one-fourth or
more of all shipments in steel and textiles.
[Table 6 here]
(b) Asian Economic Integration
The ther factor encouraging Thailand to develop manufacturing industries
has been economic integration and the reorganization of industrial structures
and corresponding trade practices among Japan, the NICs, and the ASEAN
countries. Previously, under import-substitution promotion, individual ASEAN
governments tried to encourage foreign firms such as Japanese automakers to
produce a majority of their components locally, that is, in the individual host
country. This limited industrial development, because of the small size of
14
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domestic markets and limited capabilities for local components production.
Since the early 1980s, however, countries have increasingly specialized in
different kinds of products as well as parts of the production process, according
to their technological capabilities, wage levels, capital availability, and natural
resources. At the same time, competition in low-cost manufactured goods
between ASEAN countries and the NICs, and between the NICs and Japan, have
pushed multinational companies to locate labor-intensive products from the NICs
to ASEAN countries and some machinery and electrical or electronic products
manufacturing from Japan to the NICs. Even for the same types of products,
they have tried to produce higher-priced goods in the NICs as well as Japan.
Other incentives behind this reorganization have been the rising popularity
of Japanese products around the world since the 1960s, Japanese restrictions on
imports of manufactured goods into its domestic market, and Japan's
accumulation of the world's largest trade surpluses during the 1980s. Its
economic successes and trade practices made Japan the target of serious
international criticism against its relatively closed markets as well as "vertical"
trade structure, in which Japanese firms imported fuel and inexpensive raw
materials and then exported high value-added finished goods. The type of
imbalance occurred with developed countries, such as the United States, as well
as with developing countries, especially in Asia, which provided resources for
Japanese industries but lagged far behind Japan in industrialization and had few
domestic firms capable of exporting manufactured goods to Japan (Watanabe,
1985).
The Japanese government responded positively to these criticisms by
opening domestic markets to imports and encouraging Japanese firms to move
more production operations overseas, to the United States, Europe, and Asian
countries, as well as to buy more manufactured goods from these areas
15
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(Economic Planning Agency, 1989). By the end of the 1980s, Japanese direct
investment had in fact led to the export of goods from Japanese overseas
subsidiaries not only to Europe and the United States but also to Japan. This
was especially true for Japanese subsidiaries operating in Asia. According to a
report on 178 firms to the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI), Asian NICs accounted for 60% ($707 million in current values)
of total intra-company imports of manufactured goods by major Japanese firms
in 1987. Asian NICs also accounted for 90° ($351 million dollars) of total
imports of manufactured goods by these Japanese firms based on overseas
production contracts (Japan External Trade Organization, 1989).
Industrialization in the Asian NICs as well as ASEAN countries included
the growth of non-Japanese Asian firms able to supply manufactured products to
Japan. For example, Japanese imports of manufactured products more than
doubled between 1984 and 1988, increasing from $40.6 billion to $91.8 billion
(unadjusted for inflation). Between 1987 and 1988, imports from Asian NICs
increased 47%, from ASEAN countries 49%, and from China 58%. These three
regions together accounted for 29% of total manufactured products imported into
Japan in 1988 (Japan External Trade Organization, 1989).
Thailand was a major beneficiary of these trends, with Thai manufactured
products imported by Japan increasing by 144% in only two years, from $368
mi'lion in 1986 to $897 million in 1988 (unadjusted for inflation). Manufactured
products also accounted for 33% of all Japanese imports from Thailand in 1988,
compared to 26% in 1986. The largest manufactured product Japan imported
from Thailand during 1988 in terms of value, accounting for $74 million,
remained a processed item, precious stones, that did not require much skill or
investment. The second largest item, however, was bearings ($74 million),
produced by a single Japanese firm, Minebea, Ltd. Thailand also exported $8
16
million of business-machinery parts to Japan in 1987 (Japan External Trade
Organization, 1989). In addition, Thailand exported more than $15 million worth
of integrated circuits in 1987 to other countries (Thailand Development Research
Institute Foundation, 1989).
Investments from the Asian NICs themselves contributed to development of
manufacturing capabilities in ASEAN countries as well as China that were likely
to encourage further investment in the region. In the 1980s, for example,
direct investment from the Asian NICs approved by local governments in
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and China (excluding NICs as host
countries) accounted for 37% of the total approved investment in terms of
value; this exceeded Japan's 28% share of this investment (World Bank, 1989).3
Major factors behind the increase in NICs' foreign investments seemed to be
currency appreciation in Korea and Taiwan, the Taiwanese trade surplus (second
largest in the world, behind only Japan), increases in real wages in all NICs
countries, maintenance of major markets despite protectionist measures, and the
desire to secure natural resources (especially by Korean investors). Labor
disputes both in Taiwan and Korea, as well as an environmental movement in
Taiwan, also appeared to promoted overseas investments (Clifford and Moore,
1989). Government policy in Korea and Taiwan supported investments abroad as
well but encouraged firms to retain production of more advanced products at
home, as seen in the previous discussion of Taiwanese investments in Thailand,
which focused on labor-intensive miscellaneous items.
Japanese companies were also leaders in promoting regional economic
integration and the reorganization of production operations and trade. In the
3 The time periods for counting approved direct investments are as
follows: in the case of Malaysia, from 1982 to 1987; Indonesia, from 1982 to
1988; Thailand, from 1984 to 1989; Philippines, from 1982 to 1988; China, from
1983 to 1986.
17
textile industry, Japanese companies in 1989 were planning to locate product
design and production-technology development in Japan while moving more
factory operations from the NICs to ASEAN countries and possibly to China
(Perry, 1989). In the electronics industry, several Japanese multinationals as
well as NIC's companies have already shifted various production operations from
the NICs to ASEAN countries. In the automobile industry, Mitsubishi, Toyota,
and Nissan were in the process of arranging a network to supply more parts
from within the ASEAN countries, with a halving of tariffs on intra-regional
trade of components between units of the same manufacturers (Goldstein, 1990;
Smith, 1989b; Sanger, 1990).
Thailand is experiencing another increase in Japanese investment for parts
manufacturing along with the arrival of major Japanese manufacturers such as
Sharp. Although there is a widespread feeling that the Japanese are just
transferring vertically integrated manufacturing into Thailand and relying mainly
on Japanese affiliated parts manufacturers rather than local parts producers,
there is evidence that the Japanese are increasingly using Thai producers for
simpler plastic and metal parts, and teaching these suppliers how to upgrade
their quality. While plastic mold-making has also advanced, the Thai
government and local industry have neglected production of metal molds and
dies. Nevertheless, several Japanese joint ventures associated with car makers
have begun to export Thai-made molds and dies as well as supply the local
market (Handley, 1988). In addition, the Thai government's Fifth National
Economic Development Plan announced a new focus on metal working as a
priority sector and in 1986 established the Metalworking and Machinery
Industries Development Institute with Japanese grant aid.4
4 These comments are based on personal interviews with Mr. Nagae
Tsutomu and Mr. Takeshi Izumi (Japan International Cooperation Agency
experts), carried out by Nobuko Ichikawa at the Metalworking and Machinery
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Japanese imports in 1988 of relatively advanced manufactured goods from
other countries in East and Southeast Asia provided examples of other kinds of
products that Japanese firms were considering for production in Thailand. Most
required fairly high investments in capital equipment as well as large amounts
of labor for assembly operations. These products included audio components
($218 million) and video recorders ($54 million) from Korea; battery-operated
wrist watches ($92 million) and portable radios ($7 million) from Hong Kong;
radio receivers ($83 million), bearings ($47 million), TV picture tubes ($18
million), and watch components ($15 million) from Singapore; chemical elements
for electronic components ($39 million), piezo-electric crystals ($19 million),
microcomputers and microprocessors ($10 million), and camera parts ($4 million)
from Malaysia; and computer parts ($25 million), diodes ($6 million), and
microphones ($3 million) from the Philippines (Japan External Trade
Organization, 1989).
These and other examples show how the increasing industrialization and
economic integration in East and Southeast Asia constitute an exogenous factor
beyond the control of Thai government and company officials that is strongly
pushing Thailand to expand its manufacturing sector. In particular, company
efforts to reorganize their production systems in Japan, the NICs, and ASEAN
countries, taking advantage of different capital, labor, technology, and natural
resources available in each country, as well as of political protectionism against
Japanese exports from Japan, have led Thailand to become the largest site for
new Japanese investment in Southeast Asia and an important processing base for
firms from Japan as well as the NICs.
Industries Development Institute during June 1989.
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4. STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES AND IMPLICATIONS
The NIC's versus NAIC's debate can be seen most clearly in the policy
positions Thai planners have taken. By the end of the 1980s, two groups had
emerged: One supported industrial structural change that promotes labor-
intensive export industries along with the improvement of import-substitution
industries. The other supported rural development to increase agricultural
income and expand the domestic market (Suehiro, 1987a). As shown here, the
debate is complicated because each alternative presents a different set of costs
and benefits. Nor does it seem that, in the long term, Thailand can afford not
to pursue both strategies, although, in the short term, the government may not
have the financial resources to support both manufacturing and agro-business
development.
To pursue increased foreign investment in heavy industries, for example,
Thailand will need immediate and extensive investment to expand urban roads,
water supplies, waste processing and port facilities, and similar types of
infrastructure. The government has moved in this direction with the Eastern
Seaboard Project, started in the 1970s initially to utilize natural gas in Siam
Bay. The government once suspended the project in part because of high
interest rates and slow growth in the Thai economy during the early 1980s. It
later decided to continue, because of the requirements of new foreign investors,
primarily the Japanese, and the need to reduce congestion in the port of
Bangkok. The government also felt it was important to promote basic
industries, such as petrochemicals and iron, that would create jobs as well as
attract more advanced manufacturing investments. The whole development of the
Eastern Seaboard and the building of two deep-sea ports will cost 133.5 billion
baht in a joint-venture investment between the national government and private
concerns. All individual sub-projects are scheduled for completion by 1996
20
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(Preyaluk, 1989b). The targeted areas, located about a one-and-a-half hour
drive from Bangkok, will operate as a huge production and export zone. The
Japanese government's financing organization for developing projects, The
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), is a major financial supporter,
investing in the construction of the two ports, water mains, gas-separation and
fertilizer plants, as well as industrial real estate and engineering services
(Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, 1987).
Thailand also faces a shortage of engineers, which are essential for
technology transfer and localization of production operations. This problem
cannot be solved quickly because of the small number of engineers produced in
Thai colleges (approximately 2,500 in 1986) (Myers and Chalongphob, 1989).
Accordingly, the low level of skilled labor and technological know-how in
Thailand's small and medium-sized companies makes it difficult for them to
serve as subcontractors in new manufacturing industries, especially for Japanese
investors with high standards for quality and cost control. Japanese firms have
helped by making direct investments in components production to complement
local suppliers, although, in the long run, Thailand will need to develop more
domestic capabilities to attract further investment and increase manufacturing
exports. As a result, the NIC's strategy will require support for education and
supplier industries as well as basic industries, such as steel, machinery, and
chemicals, in order to reduce dependence on foreign imports of capital goods,
intermediate goods, and basic industrial raw materials, especially from Japan.
The intensified urbanization expected to accompany a NIC's type of
development may prove to be a heavy a burden for the Thai government as
well. Agriculture still represented 65% of total employment in 1987, a rather
slow shift from 82% in 1960 compared to other countries in East Asia (National
Statistical Office, 1960, 1987). For example, Korean agriculture's share of
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employment was only 59% in 1965 and fell to 26% in 1985, while in Taiwan it
was 47% in 1965 and 18% in 1985 (International Labor Organization, 1965, 1985).
Korea and Taiwan already had less agricultural employment and were more
industrialized when rapid growth began in the mid-1960s, whereas
industrialization has proceeded more slowly in Thailand, leaving the country
heavily dependent on agricultural employment. On the positive side, this
relatively slower pace of industrialization may have prevented more
confrontations between organized labor and management (Yasuda, 1987).
Nevertheless, a shift in non-agricultural employment to a level similar to
Taiwan or Korea today would require Thailand to accelerate dramatically the
speed of employment creation in manufacturing and services. A rapid transition
from an agricultural to industrial society would also require massive migration
from rural areas to central Thailand, which would then need massive
infrastructure investments to accommodate these people. As discussed earlier,
most industrial activities in Thailand are already concentrated in highly-
congested Bangkok and the surrounding area, which produced 62% of Thailand's
gross domestic industrial output in 1986. The central region, including Bangkok
and the surrounding five prefectures, accounted for 82% (Thailand Development
Research Institute Foundation, 1989). To improve deteriorating environmental
conditions and over-congestion requires dispersing industrial activities outside of
Bangkok rather than encouraging more investment there. A NIC's strategy that
promotes foreign investment in the Central region may also worsen the
economic gap between this and other areas, especially the disadvantaged
Northeast, although Thai government officials seem to believe that the Eastern
Seaboard Project will reduce urban problems by encouraging firms to leave
Bangkok (National Social and Economic Development Board, 1981).
Another question is whether the fragile political system in Thailand will be
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able to support the changes that a NIC's strategy might bring. Both Korea and
Taiwan have experienced labor and political turmoil as their economies
industrialized and the number of urbanized middle-class and working-class
people increased. An accelerated transformation of Thailand from an
agricultural to an industrial society, while improving income levels through new
employment in manufacturing sectors, may also lead to labor and political
turmoil, especially if the government does not adequately seek solutions to
major problems such as rural poverty and urban congestion.
If it follows a NAIC's strategy, the Thai government faces numerous
challenges as well. It will still need more ports, rural roads, factories, and
irrigation and waste-processing facilities, although perhaps less than for more
advanced manufacturing industries. Even for agro-businesses, furthermore,
Thailand must develop new foreign markets and sales techniques to increase
exports, especially with growing international competition in agricultural goods.
There are nearby large potential markets in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and
thus a regional economic policy targeting the Northeast region of Thailand
would probably aid Thailand's agricultural development. Politically, however,
this policy seems difficult to carry out under present conditions.
Under the NAIC's strategy, improvement of rural income would have to
come primarily from domestic investment and growth in the agricultural sector.
Yet agricultural productivity in Thailand has been relatively low and not
increasing. As a result, although new investment and agricultural technology
may change this trend, economic growth under a NAIC's strategy and failure to
take full advantage of foreign investment may be too slow to solve rural
poverty, resulting in as much or more social and political unrest as under a
NIC's approach. Also under a NAIC's approach, the government would have to
intervene more in the economy to bring about a fairer distribution of land as
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well as profits among agro-businesses, wholesale merchants, and farmers;
however, the traditional policy of the Thai government, reinforced in the 1987-
1991 National Economic and Social Development Plan, has been to limit the
involvement of the government in a free-market economy (National Economic
and Social Development Board, 1987).
A policy to promote agro-industries, on which the NAIC's strategy is
based, brings certain constraints as well. Technology accumulated for
processing agricultural products is not easily applicable to other industries;
forward and backward linkages in agro-industries are fewer, and less likely to
create an expansion of jobs, than in manufacturing sectors such as iron,
electronics, or automobile assembly; uncontrolled agricultural expansion will also
contribute to the destruction of valuable natural resources such as Thailand's
forests. Thus, a NAIC's strategy has both negative and positive aspects, and
will probably not expand Thailand's industrial structure and economy enough to
meet future needs of the population or overcome rural as well as urban poverty.
5. CONCLUSION
On the surface, the NAIC's approach appears to have many benefits. It
would rely primarily on domestic resources, address most directly pressing
problems in Thailand such as rural poverty by promoting agricultural
development and employment in rural areas, and not encourage further urban
congestion in the Bangkok area as much as a NIC's strategy. Agricultural
productivity has lagged in Thailand, making the NAIC's strategy somewhat risky,
although further manufacturing investments will require costly infrastructure
investments without providing employment for the vast majority of Thailand's
population, which remain largely in rural areas but may continue to migrate to
Bangkok under a NIC's strategy, worsening existing urban congestion.
Meanwhile, Japan's growing influence in Thailand, as well as
industrialization and economic integration among the ASEAN countries in
general, are providing strong incentives for Thailand to move closer to the
NIC's model. In terms of economic activity and employment, the results of
Japanese investments have been positive, generating the equivalent of millions
of dollars in domestic production and export sales as well as 250,000 jobs by
mid-1989 (Toyo keizai, 1990). On the other hand, Japan has also encouraged
the Thai government to invest in costly projects such as the Eastern Seaboard,
at the expense of, for example, more investment in agriculture, land reform,
education, public transportation, health care, or homes for the rural and urban
poor. In the past, the Thai government has tried to put an equal emphasis on
investment in both agricultural and non-agricultural industries, but its financial
situation has made this increasingly difficult (National Economic and Social
Development Board, 1987).
Nor do Thai government officials and planners, or private citizens, fully
control what direction Thailand follows, since the government is unlikely to
exclude much-needed foreign investment and technology, especially from Japan.
Many Thai businessmen, workers, and government leaders want the benefits of
Japanese investment, such as new jobs, technology transfers, and access to
foreign markets. Japanese government officials and companies want access to
Thailand's resources, labor, and markets, especially as a production base from
which to export. Japan has provided aid to Thailand, mainly in the form of
loans for large-scale projects (Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, 1987).
Because of recent economic growth, however, the Japanese government plans to
cut off grants for Thailand and restrict future aid to loans (Duangkamol, 1989).
This could become a major problem, since the Japanese expect Thailand to
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continue constructing an industrial infrastructure as well as maintain political
stability.
In conclusion, choosing either a NIC's or NAIC's strategy is probably not
desirable for Thailand, since both approaches have different benefits. In the
long run, in addition to agro-industries, Thailand will have to develop
manufacturing sectors as called for in the NIC's approach, because it does not
seem possible that agricultural productivity and agro-business markets will grow
enough to solve Thailand's problems of rural poverty and halt migration into
the industrialized Central region. Regardless of whether Thailand tries to
become a NIC or NAIC, the country will also have to construct an appropriate
infrastructure for further industrial development as well as invest in support for
rural areas, such as roads, utilities, education, housing, and health care. The
NAIC's alternative, therefore, does not appear to be a distinct and final
solution for Thailand but rather an intermediate strategy. If balanced with
gradual manufacturing investments as well as continued assistance from Japan
but targeted more toward solving rural problems, this should help Thailand move
from a primarily agricultural society to a mixed agricultural and industrial
economy, utilizing its domestic natural and human resources rather than relying
too heavily on foreign investment and influence.
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Table 1: Gross Domestic Product by Industrial Sector (1975 and 1988)
( U.S.$1,000,000,000 nominal values, % )
1975 1985 1988
Gross Domestic Product $303 $1,014 $1,466
Breakdown by Sector (%)
Ag ricultu re 26.9 16.8 16.9
Manufacturing 18.7 22.1 24.4
Trade 19.2 15.1 15.8
Services 11.1 14.1 13.4
Others 24.1 31.9 29.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Thailand Development Research Institute Foundation (1989), p. 4.
Table 2: Employment by Sector, Selected Years (1975-1986)
( 1,000, % of total employed in parentheses )
1975 1980 1983 1986*
Total Population 41.,390 46,720 49,730 52,650
Total Labor Force 18,255 22,728 25,849 27,660
Total Employed 18,181 22,524 25,184 26,691
Agriculture 13,270 15,943 17,401 17,815
(73) (71) (69) (67)
Manufacturing 1,356 1,789 1,843 2,069
(7) (8) (7) (8)
Others 3,555 4,792 5,939 6,807
(20) (21) (24) (27)
Unemployed 74 204 614 969
*Note: 1986 figures are estimates.
Source: Asian Development Bank (1989), pp. 318-319.
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Table 3: Farm Land Rented (1975 and 1986)
( rai [1 rai = 0.16 hectare], % )
Land Area Year Rented Land Change (%)
Nationwide 1975 13,592,363
320,696,888
(100%) 1986 19,240,941 +41.6
South 1975 399,059
44,196,992
(18.8) 1986 686,181 +71.9
North 1975 3,408,576
106,027,680
(33.1) 1986 5,928,489 +73.9
Northeast 1975 1,289,577
105,533,963
(32.9) 1986 3,247,668 +251.9
Central 1975 8,495,151
64,923,253
(20.2) 1986 9,378,603 +10.3
Source: Preyaluk (1989a), p. 233.
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Table 4: Paddy Yield Comparison, Selected Years (1975-1988)
( kilograms of rice produced per hectare )
Country 1975 1980 1986 1987 1988
Afghanistan 2,071 2,174 2,243 2,252 2,290
Bangladesh 1,853 2,020 2,178 2,178 2,190
Burma 1,816 2,774 3,028 2,957 3,000
Cambodia 1,429 1,084 1,176 1,200 1,250
China 3,518 4,134 5,338 5,423 5,344
India 1,858 2,000 2,202 2,099 2,412
Indonesia 2,630 3,293 3,943 4,075 4,202
South Korea 5,324 4,308 6,369 6,019 6,420
Malaysia 2,661 3,645 2,932 2,981 3,034
Philippines 1,721 2,233 2,669 2,623 2,749
Taiwan 4,135 4,837 5,338 5,428 5,344
Thailand 1,825 1,909 2,052 1,986 2,1 /5
Source: Asian Development Bank (1989), p. 18.
29
--9~~""1"""""1---
Table 5: Japan's Overseas Investment Stock by Region and Industry (1989)
( U.S.$1,000,000, % )
North Latin Middle Oceania
Industry America America Asia East Europe & Africa Total
Metals
Chemicals
Elec.
Machinery
Trans.
Equip.
Textiles
General
Machinery
Lumber
& Pulp
Other Manu-
facturing
Total
Manufac-
turing
Mining
Comme rce
Finance &
Insurance
Transpor-
tation
Others
Total
2,553
2,311
5,952
3,030
493
2,610
1,377
5,618
23,944
1,647
11,693
12,370
239
25,198
75,091
1,933
590
491
1,050
439
378
200
356
2,268
1,785
2,414
66
1,128
14
1,183
1,380
1,036
389
1,916
5,437 12,371
1,557
1,508
10,990
9,235
2,890
31,617
6,912
1,913
2,509
584
7,938
32,227
328
594
1,261
4 913
4 303
11 626
522
133
63
776
5 128
46 826 238
1,273 4,857 1,961
393
20
123
1,103
3,955
14,853
2,337
922
1,031
2 101 2,181
1,527
3,338
5,295
30,164
5,487
30,919
30
7,670
6,541
10,196
6,956
50 2,669
55 4,716
2,099
8,997
49,843
13,949
20,011
41,876
12,342
48,335
186,356
Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance, cited in Keizai Koho Center (1989), p. 57.
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Table 6: Share of Japan-Affiliated Firms in Thai Manufacturing Output (1983)
(%)
Industry Japan-Affiliated Firms*
Textiles 28.8
Automobiles 57.1
Steel 24.7
Foodstuffs 3.1
Chemicals 11.3
Electrical 56.2
*Note: This share was calculated on the basis of a questionnaire sent
to individual firms collecting data on total output and
employment. The figures were then adjusted by total
employment' in each sector at Japan-affiliated firms. Sectoral
value-added data were used to estimate total shipments and
calculate the share of Japan-affiliated firms.
Source: Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Bangkok (1984), p. 10.
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